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COMMENTS
PARENTAL KIDNAPPING, CRIMINAL
CONTEMPT OF COURT, AND THE DOUBLE
JEOPARDY CLAUSE: A
RECOMMENDATION FOR STATE COURTS
Valerie Brummel*
In states such as Illinois, courts invoke the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the United States Constitution to protect parental kidnappers who have
already been held in contempt of court from subsequent prosecution under
state child kidnapping laws. State courts should not apply the Double
Jeopardy Clause to protect parental kidnappers; instead, they should follow
the example of the Ohio state courts by recognizing that contempt of court
and child kidnapping are not the same crime for double jeopardy purposes.
The many differences between the crimes of contempt and parental
kidnapping, the disparity between sanctions delivered by the court for
contempt and outlined by state legislatures for child kidnapping, and the
inability of contempt sanctions to adequately punish parental kidnappers
for the harm inflicted on their children, all provide reasons why the Double
Jeopardy Clause should not apply to contempt of court and child
kidnapping. This recommendation will help state courts better deter and
punish parental kidnapping.

* J.D., Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, 2017. B.A., The University of
Michigan, 2013. Thanks to Dean Susie Spies Roth for her advice. Thanks to my husband for
his endless patience and support. Thanks to my parents, who sacrificed everything and came
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INTRODUCTION
In the event of a divorce, parents become subject to court-issued child
custody orders, which dictate how much time they can spend with their
children and where the children will live.1 When a parent decides to
disobey the child custody order and deprive the other parent of her legal
right to custody, he has committed parental kidnapping.2 In 2010, the
1

Margaret M. Mahoney, The Enforcement of Child Custody Orders by Contempt
Remedies, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 835, 836 (2007).
2
Id.; see also William B. Johnson, Kidnapping or related offense by taking or removing
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United States Department of Justice estimated that more than 200,000
children are victims of parental kidnapping each year.3 In 2014,
HealthResearchFunding.org reported that domestic parental child abduction
figures are expected to increase by 20% annually in the coming years.4
In 1980, Congress passed the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
(PKPA) to fight parental kidnapping.5 Subsequently, all fifty states adopted
the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and imposed
criminal liability for parental kidnapping; some even went so far as to label
parental kidnapping a felony.6 However, some state courts have applied the
double jeopardy rule to protect parental kidnappers, undermining efforts by
Congress and state legislatures to punish and deter parental kidnapping.7
These courts claim that a double jeopardy problem arises where a violating
parent is guilty of both the crime of parental kidnapping and criminal
contempt of court.8 In addition to breaking state criminal laws, a parent
who retains or removes his child in violation of a child custody order has
also disobeyed the court that issued the order; thus, the court can hold the
parent in contempt for his disrespectful conduct.9 Accordingly, some courts
have held that the double jeopardy rule bars the subsequent prosecution of a
criminal contemnor under state criminal statutes.10

of child by or under authority of parent or one in loco parentis, 20 A.L.R.4th 823, 823
(1983) (stating that criminal statutes on parental kidnapping make it unlawful for a person to
(1) take a child (2) with the intent to detain and conceal such child from a parent or other
lawful custodian).
3
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CRIME OF FAMILY ABDUCTION: A CHILD AND PARENT’S
PERSPECTIVE 4 (May 2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/229933.pdf [hereinafter
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE].
4
40 Uncommon Parental Child Abduction Statistics, HEALTHRESEARCHFUNDING.ORG
(Nov. 22, 2014), http://healthresearchfunding.org/40-uncommon-parental-child-abductionstatistics [hereinafter HEALTHRESEARCHFUNDING.ORG].
5
28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1980).
6
Kathi L. Grasso et al., The Criminal Justice System’s Response to Parental Abduction,
JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN, 1 (Dec. 2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/186160.
pdf; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A–6–45(c) (West 2010); ALASKA STAT. ANN.§ 11.41.320(b)
(West 2016), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18–3–304(1) (West 2009), IOWA CODE ANN.§ 710.6
(West 2010).
7
See, e.g., In re Marriage of D’Attomo, 570 N.E.2d 796, 802 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
8
See, e.g., id. at 796; People v. Rodriguez, 514 N.E.2d 1033, 1037–38 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987); People v. Howard, 686 P.2d 644, 649 (Cal. 1984); State v. Hope, 449 So.2d 633, 636
(La. Ct. App. 1984); see also Jay M. Zitter, Contempt finding as precluding substantive
criminal charges relating to the same transaction, 26 A.L.R.4th 950 (1983).
9
See D’Attomo, 570 N.E. 2d at 796; see also Zitter, supra note 8, at 950.
10
See, e.g., In re Marriage of D’Attomo, 570 N.E.2d at 802; Fierro v. State, 653 So. 2d
447, 448–49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1995); State v. Desselle, 809 So. 2d 460, 466–67
(La. Ct. App. 2001).
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Carlson v. Carlson11 demonstrates the potential disparity between
sanctions for criminal contempt and the sentencing guidelines of the
applicable state parental kidnapping statute.12 In Carlson, the judge held a
parent in criminal contempt for violation of a child custody order and
decided that the sanction would be incarceration for five hours, “until 5:00
p.m. that day.”13 However, under Georgia’s state criminal statute outlawing
parental kidnapping, the parent could have either been fined between $200
and $500, or been imprisoned for between one and five months, or both.14
Another parent in Georgia who effectively commits the same crime at issue
in Carlson could face a much harsher punishment: if the state prosecuted
him or her under Georgia’s criminal statute, that parent could face at least a
$200 fine or a month of imprisonment.15
As Carlson demonstrates, applying the double jeopardy rule to protect
parents guilty of criminal contempt can lead to disparate results. This
Comment outlines four reasons why the double jeopardy rule should not
apply to criminal contemnors. First, under the Blockburger “same
elements” test, the crimes of contempt and parental kidnapping contain
distinct elements: contempt requires the existence and violation of a court
order while parental kidnapping does not necessarily include such an
element, and parental kidnapping requires intent to detain or conceal the
child while criminal contempt includes no such element of intent.16
Second, the crime of criminal contempt and the crime of parental
kidnapping contain significant differences such as purpose and the role of
the jury in the criminal proceedings.17 These differences demonstrate that
the legislature may not have intended for criminal contempt and parental
kidnapping to be considered the same offense for double jeopardy purposes,
and state courts must implement legislative intent in their double jeopardy
analyses.18 Third, ensuring that the state may prosecute parental kidnappers

11

748 S.E.2d 304 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).
Id. at 307–08; GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-45 (West 2010).
13
Carlson, 748 S.E.2d at 306.
14
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-45.
15
See id.
16
Dixon v. United States, 509 U.S. 688, 701–02 (1993) (reaffirming the validity of the
Blockburger same elements test); see also United States v. Blockburger, 284 U.S. 299, 304
(1932); see, e.g., State v. Kimbler, 509 N.E.2d 99, 104 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
criminal contempt and parental kidnapping should not be considered the same crime under
the Blockburger same elements test).
17
Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495 (1974); Kimbler, 509 N.E.2d at 103–04.
18
William S. McAninch, Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L. REV. 411,
448 (1993).
12
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under its criminal statutes results in more consistent sentencing.19 Finally,
considering the significant harms that parental kidnapping inflicts on both
the custodial parent and the child, a finding of criminal contempt alone does
not adequately punish parental kidnappers.20 Therefore, courts should hold
that the double jeopardy rule does not protect a parental kidnapper from
punishment under both criminal contempt of court and state criminal
statutes.
First, Part I of this Comment discusses the history of judicial oversight
in child custody cases and introducing the problem of parental kidnapping.
Next, Part II identifies five methods by which the legal system combats
parental kidnapping: federal legislation, state criminal statutes, judicial
enforcement of child custody orders, tort law, and court-sponsored
mediation. Next, Part III outlines the history of the double jeopardy rule
and explains how different courts have applied it to criminal contempt of
court and parental kidnapping. Finally, Part IV explains the four
aforementioned reasons why courts should hold parental kidnappers
responsible under state criminal laws, regardless of any prior criminal
contempt sanctions.
I. BACKGROUND
The history of judicial oversight in American child custody cases
begins in the early twentieth century.
Over time, child custody
jurisprudence evolved from the traditional paternal preference to the “best
interests of the child” standard used by courts today.21 In light of the
19

Some states, such as Massachusetts and Nebraska, have no limits on criminal
contempt penalties. Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REV. 345,
407 n.379 (2000). In contrast, state criminal statutes provide guidelines as to how parental
kidnappers should be sentenced. See generally NDAA Parental Kidnapping Compilation,
infra note 60.
20
See Geoffrey Greif, Parental child abduction and its impact, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY,
(Nov. 13, 2010), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/buddy-system/201011/parentalchild-abduction-and-its-impact (“[R]eactions to abduction include: nightmares, fears of
doors and windows, bedwetting (depending on age), fear of authority and strangers, anger at
abductor and left-behind parent, depression, anxiety, and school and peer problems.
Problems for many adults persist into their 20s, 30s, 40s, and 50s”); Administrative Office of
the Courts, Effects of Parental Abduction in Child Custody Cases, WASHINGTON COURTS,
https://www.courts.wa.gov/newsInfo/content/pdf/HarmfulEffectsOfParentalAbduction.pdf
[hereinafter WASHINGTON COURTS] (“If the child is very young when abducted and is
returned as an older child, the child may suffer serious negative emotional effects because
the child feels as if he or she is returned to a stranger, and therefore the return to the parent
who was originally left behind seems like an abduction itself.”).
21
See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. (Aug. 2, 1973); J. Herbie
DiFonzo, From the Rule of One to Shared Parenting: Custody Presumptions in Law and
Policy, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 213, 215–16 (2014) (describing modern courts’ tendencies to
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court’s decision-making role in child custody disputes, there are various
motivations for parental kidnapping, as well as different factors that
contributed to the rise of parental kidnapping.
A. JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT IN CHILD CUSTODY CASES: HISTORY AND
MODERN APPLICATION

In the United States, natural parents have a “fundamental liberty
interest . . . in the care, custody, and management of their child.”22 As
Justice Blackmun wrote in Santosky v. Kramer, “Even when blood
relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the
irretrievable destruction of their family life.”23
There are four classes of proceedings in United States law that affect
the custody of a child: (1) divorce and dissolution of a marriage, (2)
guardianship law, (3) juvenile court and neglect laws, and (4) laws relating
to the termination of parental authority for adoption.24 This Comment
addresses the first class of proceedings, after the divorce and dissolution of
a marriage.
Prior to a divorce, parenting activity is not subject to detailed
regulation by the state.25 However, after a divorce, the court system has the
authority to regulate parents through child custody and visitation orders.26
These judicial orders dictate which parent is the primary guardian, how
much time each parent can spend with the child, and where the children will
live.27 In the eyes of the law, child custody orders serve the important
purpose of protecting the established relationships between children and
both of their parents, in light of the changed family circumstances that
result from divorce.28
Under traditional English common law—which serves as the
foundation of American law in this area—fathers had patria potestas, or
parental power, over their children, whom the fathers viewed as chattel or
servants.29 However, in the early twentieth century, both British and

encourage joint legal custody or shared parenting, as long as it is in the best interests of the
child).
22
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
23
Id.
24
Christopher L. Blakesley, Child Custody—Jurisdiction and Procedure, 35 EMORY L.
J. 291, 297 (1986).
25
Mahoney, supra note 1, at 836.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the Child
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American courts shifted their custody supposition: under the new “Tender
Years doctrine,” courts presumed that mothers should have custody of their
young children, unless the father could show that the mother was “unfit.”30
The tender years doctrine suggested that mothers are “softer and more
natural nurturers” than fathers, as well as “biologically better designed” for
childrearing.31
In 1970, American child custody law evolved to a “neutral best
interests of the child” standard in deciding custody, as recommended by the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA).32 Most states passed statutes
listing factors that a judge should consider when determining the child’s
best interests.33 The UMDA also set forth a general presumption of
visitation rights for the other parent.34 Accordingly, most states passed laws
protecting the access rights of the noncustodial parent;35 generally, a court
would only deny visitation rights if the judge believed that contact with the
other parent would endanger the child.36 Finally, in the 1980s, courts began
to encourage joint legal custody or shared parenting, rather than naming one
parent as primary custodian, as long as it was in the best interests of the
child.37 This policy remains in effect today.38
Standard in American Jurisprudence, 10 J. L. FAM. STUD. 337, 345–46 (2007).
30
Laura Beleau, Farewell to Heart Balm Doctrines and the Tender Years Presumption,
Hello to the Genderless Family, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 365, 379–81 (2012)
(describing the tender years doctrine as the “legal presumption that the mother is the best
custodian for infants and young children”); Kohm, supra note 29, at 346; June Carbone &
Leslie J. Harris, Family Law Armageddon: The Story of Morgan v. Foretich, in FAMILY LAW
STORIES 139 (Carol Sanger ed., 2008).
31
Beleau, supra note 30, at 380.
32
UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. (Aug. 2, 1973) [hereinafter
UMDA] (“The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the
child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including: (1) the wishes of the child’s
parent or parents as to his custody; (2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian; (3) the
interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his siblings, and any
other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest; (4) the child’s adjustment
to his home, school, and community; and (5) the mental and physical health of all
individuals involved.”).
33
Carbone & Harris, supra note 30, at 141.
34
See UMDA § 407A(a), supra note 32.
35
Thomas R. Young, Legal Rights of Children, 1 LEG. RTS. CHILD. REV. 2D § 3:2 (3d
ed.) (2015) (“As a general rule, it is recognized that a noncustodial separated parent has a
liberty interest in communicating with and visiting his or her child where custody of the
child has been granted to the State or to the other custodial parent.”).
36
Kohm, supra note 29, at 359.
37
DiFonzo, supra note 21, at 215–16.
38
Id.; see also Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST.
L. J. 455, 455 n.2 (1984) (stating that today, approximately 30 states have joint custody laws
and many other states have considered similar legislation).
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B. THE PROBLEM OF PARENTAL KIDNAPPING

Because state courts have the power to issue child custody orders,
divorced parent may not be able to go wherever they want, whenever they
want, with their child. As a result, some divorced parents may decide to
violate the child custody order, and in some situations their decisions
amount to child kidnapping.39 In the typical parental kidnapping case, the
noncustodial parent, often with the aid of relatives, withholds the child from
the custodial parent and attempts to conceal the child’s location in violation
of a court-ordered custody decree.40 Kidnapping statutes generally require
proof of intent to detain or conceal the child from the custodial parent.41
In 1979, Senator Alan Cranston estimated that 25,000 parental
kidnappings occurred each year.42 Congress responded in 1984 by passing
the Missing Children’s Assistance Act, which directed the U.S. Department
of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP)
to establish a national resource center to provide additional research on the
topic.43 Since the Act’s passage, the OJJDP has conducted two major
studies: The National Incidence Studies of Missing, Abducted, Runaway,
and Thrownaway Children (NISMART) in 1988 and the follow up,
nicknamed NISMART-2, in 1999.44 NISMART-2 predicted that, in the
twenty years since Senator Cranston’s statement before Congress’s
Subcommittee on Child and Human Development, parental kidnapping had
risen almost tenfold to an estimated 203,900 children per year.45
39
William B. Johnson, Liability of legal or natural parent, or one who aids and abets,
for damages resulting from abduction of own child, 49 A.L.R.4th 7 (1986).
40
Id.
41
Id.; see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §750.350a (West 2014) (setting out a specific
intent element for parental kidnapping: “the intent to detain or conceal the child from any
other parent or legal guardian of the child who has custody or visitation rights pursuant to a
lawful court order at the time of the taking or retention”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4501(2)
(West 2016) (setting out the intent element of kidnapping in the second degree as “intent to
keep or conceal [a child] from its custodial parent, guardian, or other person having lawful
care or control thereof”); ANN. CAL. PENAL CODE § 278 (West 2011) (setting out the intent
element as “intent to detain or conceal that child from a lawful custodian”).
42
Sue T. Bentch, Comment, Court-Sponsored Custody Mediation to Prevent Parental
Kidnapping: A Disarmament Proposal, 18 ST. MARY’S L.J. 361, 361 n.1 (1986) (citing
Proposed Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act: Hearings on S. 105 Before the
Subcomm. on Child and Human Dev. of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979) (statement of Senator Alan Cranston)).
43
Missing Children’s Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title IV of the Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (1974); Adrienne L. Fernandes-Alcantra,
Missing and Exploited Children: Background, Policies, and Issues, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE 3, (April 29, 2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34050.pdf.
44
Fernandes-Alcantra, supra note 43, at 4.
45
Id.
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Some scholars explain the modern rise of parental kidnapping through
social causes.46 First, high divorce rates have increased the number of
children who are potential victims of parental kidnapping.47 Disgruntled
divorcees may use their children as “ammunition” to retaliate against their
ex-spouses.48 Alternately, one parent may seek to move to another state
after the divorce—perhaps to live closer to relatives or in the event of a
remarriage; however, the other parent may successfully prevent such a
move by arguing that relocation would violate the child custody order or
make the current arrangement unworkable.49 If a parent’s efforts to move
out of state after a divorce are thwarted, he may resort to parental
kidnapping.50
Second, parental kidnapping stories attract publicity, which may
ironically encourage more parents to use such a strategy to maintain or
regain custody and control over their children.51 Third, the ease of
interstate transportation allows for greater mobility for parental kidnappers
to move their children out of the other parent’s reach.52 Finally, some
fathers feel that the legal system is biased against them in determining
custody and visitation rights, such that they will not be granted custody or
favorable visitation rights.53 These fathers may resort to parental
46

Bentch, supra note 42, at 364.
Id.; see also National Vital Statistics System, National Marriage and Divorce Rate
Trends, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/
marriage_divorce_tables.htm (stating that in each year from 2000 through 2014, over two
million married couples got divorced in the United States).
48
Id.
49
See Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A Constitutional Perspective,
34 U. OF LOUISVILLE J. OF FAM. L. 1, 2–3 (1996) (“Many women, as they contemplate
interstate relocation, find their former husbands seek to prevent such a move. Moreover, the
former husbands are frequently successful, particularly in the trial courts.”); Linda D. Elrod,
A Move in the Right Direction? Best Interests of the Child Emerging as the Standard for
Relocation Cases, 3 J. OF CHILD CUSTODY 29, 44 (2006).
50
Elrod, supra note 49, at 44–45 (“A parent who ‘thinks’ that the environment in
another location may be better for their health may find the court rejecting the relocation for
that reason. Courts have not been sympathetic to parents who unilaterally act in taking the
children from the jurisdiction without the court or the other parent’s permission.”).
51
Bentch, supra note 42, at 364–65; see also Jeremy D. Morley, Preventing
International Child Abduction in Divorce, 28 A.B.A. SOLO, SMALL FIRM & GEN. PRACTICE
DIVISION 3, at 5 (April/May 2011) (observing that child custody judges are “aware of the
firestorm of publicity” elicited by parental kidnapping cases).
52
Richard A. Campbell, Note, Transition: The Tort of Custodial Interference—Toward
a More Complete Remedy to Parental Kidnappings, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 229, 233 (1983).
53
Joseph R. Hillebrand, Note, Parental Kidnapping and the Tort of Custodial
Interference: Not in a Child’s Best Interests, 25 IND. L. REV. 893, 895 n.16 (“The
noncustodial father feels alienated from his children and angry at the legal system, which
places strict limits on the amount of time noncustodial parents are allowed to see their
47
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kidnapping, believing it maximizes the amount of time they can spend with
their children.
Other scholars attribute the rise in parental kidnapping to early
jurisdictional problems in child custody matters.54 Prior to the 1960s, little
federal regulation existed to govern child custody jurisdiction.55 As a
result, state courts were often aggressive in asserting jurisdiction in child
custody cases, even doing so when they knew that another state’s courts had
already asserted jurisdiction in the same matter.56 As a result, a parent
could move his child into another jurisdiction and ask the court of the new
state to modify the child custody order.57 Fortunately, after Congress
enacted the PKPA in 1982, state courts could no longer grant such requests
from parents engaging in parental kidnapping because the PKPA created a
federal obligation that all states defer to the prior custody proceedings and
decisions of their sister states.58 Regardless of its causes, parental
kidnapping presented a problem for courts and legislatures in the second
half of the twentieth century and remains a problem today.59
II. CURRENT METHODS OF COMBATING PARENTAL KIDNAPPING
The legal system currently uses five methods to combat parental
kidnapping in the United States: federal legislation (namely, the UCCJA
and the PKPA), state criminal laws, enforcement of child custody orders,
tort law, and court-sponsored child custody mediation.60
children and punishes them for falling behind on support payments”) (citing JOHN E. GILL,
STOLEN CHILDREN 37 (1981)); see also HEALTHRESEARCHFUNDING.ORG, supra note 4.
54
See, e.g., Amy M. Palesch, A Small Amount of Change for the Good of Children:
Replacing the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act with the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act in South Carolina, 58 S.C. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2007);
Nancy S. Erickson, The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act: How can Non-Marital
Children Be Protected?, 18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 529, 530 (1988).
55
Erickson, supra note 54, at 530.
56
Id.; Blakesley, supra note 24, at 293.
57
Erickson, supra note 54, at 530.
58
Roger M. Baron, Federal Preemption in the Resolution of Child Custody Jurisdiction
Disputes, 45 ARK. L. REV. 885, 890 (1993).
59
See Bentch, supra note 42, at 361; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3
(estimating in 2010 that more than 200,000 children are victims of parental kidnapping each
year).
60
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 4607 (1984). See generally David Carl Minneman,
Recognition and enforcement of out-of-state custody decree under § 13 of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28
U.S.C.A. § 1738A(a), 40 A.L.R.5th 227 (1996); National District Attorneys Association,
National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse & National District Attorneys Association
Parental Kidnapping Compilation, NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, (June
2010), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/Parental%20Kidnapping%20June%202010.pdf [hereinafter
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A. FEDERAL LEGISLATION – THE UCCJA AND THE PKPA

In the early 1960s, the increase in the numbers of divorces and the
consequent child custody disputes brought the problem of parental
kidnapping to the forefront of national attention.61 At that time, the
Supreme Court of the United States had not settled the question of whether
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution applied to child custody
orders, so state courts continued to modify their sister states’ child custody
decrees.62
In 1968, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws crafted the UCCJA.63 The UCCJA laid out a scheme in which one
court, the “custody court,” would assume full responsibility for the custody
of a particular child, to the exclusion of courts in other states.64
The custody court would be chosen based on which state has access to
the most relevant information about the child and family.65
If the child no longer had ties to the state of the custody court—for
example, because the family moved to another state—a new custody court
would be selected.66 By 1979, thirty-nine states had adopted the UCCJA.67
Unfortunately, many cases decided after the UCCJA noted its failure to
prevent interstate conflicts due to a lack of uniformity.68
A non-conforming state that had not adopted the UCCJA or had
adopted it with modifications could still serve as an attractive “haven” to
the losing party in custody decisions.69 Furthermore, the UCCJA’s
dependence on judicial interpretation led to inconsistent application: state
NDAA Parental Kidnapping Compilation]; Mahoney, supra note 1, at 836; George L. Blum,
Recognition and Application of the Common Law Action for Tortious Interference with
Parental Rights, 103 A.L.R.6th 461 (2015).
61
Sheldon A. Vincenti, The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act: Time to Reassess, 33
IDAHO L. REV. 351, 362–63 (1997).
62
Office of Justice Programs, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, The
Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2 (Dec.
2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/189181.pdf.; Erickson, supra note 54, at 530.
63
Vincenti, supra note 61, at 365.
64
Id. at 365–66 (quoting Bridget M. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22
VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1218 (1969)).
65
Vincenti, supra note 61, at 365.
66
Id. at 366 (quoting Bridget M. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV.
1207, 1218 (1969)).
67
Id. at 368.
68
Minneman, supra note 60, at 227.
69
Baron, supra note 58, at 890 (quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 180
(1988)).
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courts often interpreted the flexible provisions of the UCCJA in their own
favor to claim jurisdiction.70
Still, the widespread acceptance of the UCCJA garnered the attention
of the media and, subsequently, Congress.71 In response to interstate
disputes caused by the UCCJA, Congress passed the PKPA in 1980.72 As
an addendum to the full faith and credit statute of the United States Code,
the PKPA created a federal obligation that all states defer to the prior
custody proceedings and decisions of their sister states.73 Thus, although
the UCCJA could result in more than one state claiming to meet the
conditions set forth for the custody court, the PKPA eliminated the
possibility of concurrent jurisdiction.74 The PKPA required that each state
“enforce according to its terms” any custody decree that satisfies the
jurisdictional criteria of the Act and refrain from exercising jurisdiction if
an action was already pending in another qualified forum.75
The original PKPA also proposed making parental kidnapping a
federal crime.76 However, Congress ultimately decided not to make
interstate parental kidnapping a federal crime.77 Although the proposal was
supported by the American Bar Association (a non-profit organization
called Children’s Rights, Inc.) and some individual parents, the measure
was strongly opposed by the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation as “unduly harsh and a misuse of scarce resources.”78
Instead, the final version of the PKPA simply held that interstate parental
kidnappers could be punished under the Fugitive Felon Act79 as long as
70

Baron, supra note 58, at 890; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 62, at 2.
Vincenti, supra note 61, at 368 (citing Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1979:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Child and Human Dev. of the Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 96th Cong. 150–59, 244–64 (1979)).
72
See Blakesley, supra note 24, at 355; Linda M. Demelis, Note, Interstate Child
Custody and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act: The Continuing Search for a National
Standard, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1330, 1329-30 (1994); Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners,
and Personal Jurisdiction, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 813 (1995)).
73
Baron, supra note 58, at 891–92.
74
Vincenti, supra note 61, at 356.
75
Id. at 370 (quoting 28 U.S.C § 1738A(a) (1995)).
76
Id. at 368.
77
Anne B. Goldstein, The Tragedy of the Interstate Child: A Critical Reexamination of
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act, 25
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 27 (1992). Notably, Congress did make international parental
kidnapping a crime under the International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act (IPKCA). 18
U.S.C. § 1204 (1998). Under the IPKCA, an international parental kidnapper can be
punished with fine and/or imprisonment of up to three years. Id.
78
Goldstein, supra note 77, at 27.
79
18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982). The penalty for violating the Fugitive Felon Act is a fine
71
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parental kidnapping was a felony in the state where the child was stolen.80
Since the PKPA was passed, scholars have disagreed about the
relationship between the PKPA and the UCCJA.81 Professor Sheldon
Vincenti of the University of Idaho College of Law, for example, argues
that the PKPA was intended to eradicate the so-called “haven state”—any
state that did not adopt the UCCJA—where parental kidnappers could seek
refuge.82 Professor Vincenti points to a statement by Senator Malcolm
Wallop of Wyoming, the author and sponsor of the PKPA, in which he
voiced his hopes that by requiring every state to “enforce the decrees of
sister states that have adopted the Uniform Act,” the PKPA would motivate
every state to adopt the UCCJA.83 Senator Wallop wrote, “Assuming all
fifty states and the District of Columbia do adopt the [UCCJA, the PKPA]
will retain its usefulness in those cases in which a court might ignore the
state law but would be hard pressed to ignore both state and federal law.”84
The Senator further noted that universal adoption of the UCCJA would
render the PKPA largely unnecessary and perhaps even mandate its
repeal.85 Thus, based on Senator Wallop’s statements, Professor Vincenti
claims that Congress intended for the UCCJA and PKPA to work
together.86
In contrast, Christopher Blakesley, a law professor at the University of
Nevada Las Vegas William S. Boyd School of Law, argues that in
adjudicating child custody jurisdictional disputes, courts must ask two
questions: (1) whether the court has jurisdiction, and (2) whether to exercise
it.87 According to Blakesley, the PKPA and the UCCJA work together to
guide courts in answering the first question, while the UCCJA provides the
answer to the second question.88 However, Blakesley also notes that the
PKPA does not prohibit a state from enforcing a custody decree that is not
enforceable under the federal act, if the decree is enforceable under the
and/or imprisonment, as well as extradition to the state from which he or she fled. See id.
80
Id.
81
See Blakesley, supra note 23, at 355; Demelis, supra note 72, at 1330; Wasserman,
supra note 23, at 866–67.
82
Vincenti, supra note 61, at 369.
83
Id.
84
Id. (quoting Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1979, S. 105: Addendum to Joint
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary and the
Subcomm. on Child and Human Dev. of the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 86th
Cong. 96–54).
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Blakesley, supra note 24, at 355.
88
Id.
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UCCJA.89 Thus, where the PKPA and UCCJA disagree, the court has
discretion to issue a finding consistent with the “underlying statutory
UCCJA policy to discourage child snatching, avoid jurisdictional
competition, and create greater stability,” and is not restricted by the
provisions of the PKPA.90 Ultimately, the ambiguity surrounding the
relationship between the PKPA and the UCCJA illustrates that courts must
take additional steps to consistently and adequately punish and deter
parental kidnapping.
In the same vein, some scholars argue that the PKPA and UCCJA are
ineffective at combating parental kidnapping.91
Professor Rhonda
Wasserman of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law criticizes the
PKPA, arguing that it gives the custody court an unconstitutional power to
bind parents solely based on subject matter jurisdiction, regardless of
whether the court has personal jurisdiction.92 Similarly, Linda Demelis,
attorney and editor of TheCorporateCounsel.net, points out that state courts
often disagree in their interpretations of the PKPA’s jurisdictional rules, just
as they had differed in interpreting the UCCJA’s rules.93 For example, the
PKPA provides little guidance for how courts should decide a child’s
“home state” in joint custody situations; after all, a child in joint custody
may have two established homes in two different states.94 Due to the
inconsistencies in applying the PKPA, Demelis suggests that the best way
to establish a uniform national standard is for individual state legislatures to
expressly adopt child-based jurisdiction, where the custody court is
determined based on where the child spends the majority of the year.95
Ultimately, it is unlikely that the UCCJA and PKPA alone can
effectively combat parental kidnapping without additional support from
state legislatures and courts.

89

Id.
Neger v. Neger, 459 A.2d 628, 639 (N.J. 1983).
91
See, e.g., Demelis, supra note 72, at 1329–31; Wasserman, supra note 72, at 813.
92
Wasserman, supra note 72, at 867–68 (explaining that the PKPA gives a state court
the power to adjudicate child custody disputes as long as it is the child’s “home state” or had
been the child’s home state within six months before commencement of the child custody
proceedings, regardless of whether the child or either parent is still domiciled there or
whether the state court has in personam jurisdiction over the parents).
93
Demelis, supra note 72, at 1330–31.
94
Id. at 1343–44.
95
Id. at 1344–45.
90
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B. STATE LEGISLATION – THE CRIME OF PARENTAL KIDNAPPING OR
CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE

Beyond the UCCJA and PKPA, state legislatures have attempted to
combat parental kidnapping through criminal statutes, which label such
conduct as a misdemeanor or a felony.96 The U.S. Supreme Court has
declared that child custody cases are considered a matter of state law.97
Accordingly, states have the power to decide whether and how to punish
parents who violate child custody orders through parental kidnapping.98
Historically, parents could not be criminally prosecuted for kidnapping
their own children.99 Federal kidnapping laws granted parental immunity;
for example, the Lindbergh Act, enacted in 1932, exemplified the notion
that parents have the sovereign right to do whatever they think is best for
the child.100 Similarly, before the passage of the PKPA and the UCCJA,
several state kidnapping laws had instituted parental immunity.101
However, prompted in part by the PKPA, all fifty states and the District of
Columbia have amended their kidnapping laws: some revised their original
laws to expressly include parents, others passed statutes specifically
criminalizing parental kidnapping.102 Furthermore, perhaps because of the
PKPA’s Fugitive Felon provision, many states categorized parental
kidnapping as a felony.103 However, parental kidnapping criminal statutes

96

See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.10 (West 2010) (“An offense under this section
is a state jail felony.”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5 (2010) (“A person convicted of child
abduction under this Section is guilty of a Class 4 felony.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
750.350(a) (2010) (“A parent who violates [this section] is guilty of a felony . . . .”).
97
Baron, supra note 58, at 885–86.
98
Id.
99
See State v. Benner, 385 A.2d 48, 49 (Me. 1978).
100
Bentch, supra note 42, at 365 n.20 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982) (punishing
“whoever unlawfully . . . kidnaps, abducts, or carries away . . . any person, except in the case
of a minor by the parent thereof”)).
101
Id. (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 17-A, § 301 (1983) (providing a defense to
kidnapping where the victim of abduction is the child of the actor); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
20.03 (b)(2) (1974) (providing an affirmative defense to kidnapping where the victim of
abduction is related to the actor)).
102
Bentch, supra note 42, at 378.
103
Id. at 378–79. The Fugitive Felon provision of the PKPA refers to the Fugitive Felon
Act, a federal statute that prohibits individuals who have committed a felony under state law
from interstate or international travel. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1996). Individuals found to be
fugitive felons are subject to federal prosecution and penalties. 1780. Fugitive Felon Act—
18 U.S.C. 1073, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICES OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS, https://
www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-1780-fugitive-felon-act-18-usc-1073. The
primary purpose of the Fugitive Felon Act is “to permit the Federal government to assist in
the location and apprehension of fugitives from state justice.” Id.
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still vary widely from state to state.104
C. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF CUSTODY ORDERS

State courts also have the power to combat parental kidnapping by
holding parents in contempt of court for violating child custody orders.105
As products of the court, child custody orders are mandatory.106 In order to
enforce child custody orders, courts use the remedies of civil and criminal
contempt.107 Contempt is defined as the “misbehavior of any person in [the
court’s] presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of
justice” or “disobedience or resistance to [the court’s] lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree, or command.”108 The distinction between civil and
criminal contempt is significant because if the contempt is considered civil
and the relief remedial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply.109
Civil and criminal contempt are significantly different. In Shillitani v.
United States,110 the U.S. Supreme Court articulated the test for determining
whether contempt is civil or criminal in nature: “It is not the fact of
punishment but rather its character and purpose that often serve to
distinguish civil from criminal contempt. . . . The test may be stated as:
what does the court primarily seek to accomplish by imposing [the]
sentence?”111 If the purpose of the sentence is to coerce, the proceeding is
civil; if the purpose of the sentence is to punish, the court has imposed

104

See generally NDAA Parental Kidnapping Compilation, supra note 60. See also
J.E.K., Offense of abduction or kidnapping as affected by defendant’s belief in legality of his
act, 114 A.L.R. 870 (1938).
105
Mahoney, supra note 1, at 854 (“Under the laws of most states, the range of judicial
remedies for the violation of custody and visitation orders is wide. First, contempt remedies
become available whenever parental noncompliance is viewed as the violation of a coercive
or injunctive order of the court.”).
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Paul A. Grote, Purging Contempt: Eliminating the Distinction Between Civil and
Criminal Contempt, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1247, 1248 (2011) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 401
(2006)).
109
See State v. Hope, 449 So. 2d 633, 635 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (“At the onset, we
must determine whether the contempt proceeding against defendant was civil or criminal. If
the proceeding was civil in nature, trial of defendant on the kidnapping charge would not
constitute double jeopardy.”); see also Robert B. Adrine & Alexandra M. Ruden, § 13:13.
Court enforcement of civil protection orders—Double jeopardy concerns, in OH. DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE L. § 13:13 (December 2014).
110
384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966).
111
Id. at 369–70 (quoting Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441
(1911)).
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criminal contempt.112 In United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell,113 the
Court further elaborated that the line between civil and criminal contempt
sanctions is drawn “not from the subjective intent of a State’s laws and its
courts, but from an examination of the character of the relief itself.”114 The
Court explained:
The paradigmatic coercive, civil contempt sanction . . . involves confining a
contemnor indefinitely until he complies with an affirmative command such as [a
court order] . . . . Imprisonment for a fixed term similarly is coercive when the
contemnor is given the option of earlier release if he complies. . . . By contrast, a fixed
sentence of imprisonment is punitive and criminal if it is imposed retrospectively for a
‘completed act of disobedience,’ such that the contemnor cannot avoid or abbreviate
115
the confinement through later compliance.

Previously, in United States v. Halper,116 the U.S. Supreme Court held
that a civil suit brought by the government could constitute a second
punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause: “the labels
‘criminal’ and ‘civil’ are not of paramount importance . . . a civil as well as
a criminal sanction constitutes punishment.”117 However, in Hudson v.
United States,118 the Court disavowed its previous holding in Halper and
instead declared that double jeopardy only protects against the imposition
of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense.119
In summary, state courts can prevent parental kidnapping and enforce
child custody decrees by holding parents in civil or criminal contempt of
court, depending on whether the court’s goal is to coerce the parent into
compliance with the custody order or to punish the parent for a prior
violation.120 However, if the state also determines that the crime of parental
kidnapping has the same elements as criminal contempt of court, then a
parental kidnapper who has already been prosecuted for criminal contempt
cannot be subsequently charged with the crime of parental kidnapping.

112

Id. at 370.
512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994).
114
Id. (quoting Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 633 (1988)).
115
Id. at 828–29 (quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at 498).
116
490 U.S. 435, 447–48 (1989).
117
Id. at 447–48. The Court thus concluded that “the Government may not criminally
prosecute a defendant, impose a criminal penalty upon him, and then bring a separate civil
action based on the same conduct and receive a judgment that is not rationally related to the
goal of making the Government whole.” Id. at 451.
118
522 U.S. 93, 100–02 (1997).
119
Ultimately, in Hudson, the U.S. Supreme Court announced a return to the previously
articulated double jeopardy standard from United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980). Id.
at 103.
120
Grote, supra note 108, at 1248.
113
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D. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR PARENTAL KIDNAPPING UNDER TORT LAW

Certain states allow parents to sue each other for parental kidnapping
through the tort law system.121 Although the PKPA provides a federal
solution to state jurisdictional disputes, it does not provide a federal remedy
through civil litigation.122 In Thompson v. Thompson,123 two private parties
tried to sue in federal court to determine which of their conflicting state
custody decrees was valid.124 The U.S. Supreme Court held that although
the PKPA furnishes a rule of decision for courts to use in adjudicating
custody disputes, it does not create an entirely new cause of action in
federal courts.125
However, some states recognize a private cause of action for parents
who have been victimized by parental kidnapping, issuing damages for
“tortious interference with the custodial parent-child relationship.”126 The
second Restatement of Torts codifies this cause of action in § 700, Causing
Minor Child to Leave or not to Return Home: “One who, with knowledge
that the parent does not consent, abducts or otherwise compels or induces a
minor child to leave a parent legally entitled to its custody or not to return
to the parent after it has been left him, is subject to liability to the parent.”127
Several states, such as Wisconsin and Louisiana, have adopted the tort of
unlawful intentional interference with custody of a parent entitled to that
custody, as laid out in § 700.128
In another example, the Supreme Court of Virginia recognized a
private cause of action for parents for loss of custody in Wyatt v.
McDermott.129 In Wyatt, the biological father—who was not alleged to be
an unfit parent—sought legal recourse against the child’s mother for

121

See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 496–97 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying
Wisconsin state law); Spencer v. Terebelo, 373 So. 2d 200, 202 (La. Ct. App.1979) (citing
14 LSA-R.S. § 45).
122
See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 187 (1988).
123
484 U.S. 174 (1988).
124
Id. at 177–78.
125
Id. at 187 (“The context in which the PKPA was enacted—the existence of
jurisdictional deadlocks among the States in custody cases and a nationwide problem of
interstate parental kidnaping—suggests that Congress’ principal aim was to extend the
requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody determinations, and not to create
an entirely new cause of action False Congress did not intend the federal courts to play the
enforcement role.”).
126
Blum, supra note 60, at 461; see, e.g., Loeffler, 694 F.2d at 496–97; Terebelo, 373
So. 2d at 202.
127
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (1977).
128
Loeffler, 694 F.2d at 496–97; Terebelo, 373 So. 2d at 202 (citing 14 LSA-R.S. § 45).
129
725 S.E.2d 555, 562 (Va. 2012).
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intentionally preventing him from exercising his parental rights.130 The
Virginia court ruled in favor of the father and established the tort of
interference with parental rights, requiring the plaintiff to prove the
following elements:
(1) the complaining parent has a right to establish or maintain a parental or custodial
relationship with his/her minor child; (2) a party outside of the relationship . . .
intentionally interfered . . . by removing or detaining the child from returning to the
complaining parent, without the parent’s consent, or by otherwise preventing the
complaining parent from exercising his/her parental or custodial rights; (3) the outside
party’s intentional interference caused harm to the complaining parent’s . . .
131
relationship with his/her child; and (4) damages resulted from such interference.

The court further held that denying the father a private right of action for
parental kidnapping would be “both astonishing and profoundly
disturbing.”132 Accordingly, parents in Virginia may sue under the tort of
interference with parental rights to seek legal redress.133
However, there are also states that do not provide a civil remedy for
parents victimized by parental kidnapping.134 For example, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota refused to create such a tort in Larson v. Dunn.135 The
Larson court expressed its concern that allowing parents to bring civil suits
against each other for parental kidnapping would not serve the best interests
of the children, as it would only intensify intra-family conflict after divorce:

130

Id. at 564.
Id. at 562 (quoting Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720, 765–66 (W. Va. 1998)).
132
Id. at 564.
133
Maryland, Iowa, and Florida courts also allow parents to recover under the tort of
interference with parental custody rights. See, e.g., Stone v. Wall, 734 So. 2d 1038, 1047
(Fla. 1999) (holding that parental kidnapping causes “real harm that the tort [for intentional
interference with the custodial parent-child relationship] is designed to redress, including
substantial expenses incurred by a parent in having the child returned”); Murphy v. I.S.K.
Con. Of New England, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 340, 352 (Mass. 1991) (recognizing the tort of
intentional interference with the parent child relationship as a “contemporary expression
encompassing actions for abduction, enticement, harboring, and secreting of a minor child
from the parent having legal custody”); Wood v. Wood, 338 N.W.2d 123, 127 (Iowa 1983)
(“A tort suit will be more likely to effect a speedy return of the child; it will result in better
cooperation by potential third-party defendants seeking to avoid the suit; potential punitive
damages will serve as an additional deterrent; and increased knowledge of the child’s
whereabouts will result through the broad scope of civil-case discovery.”).
134
See Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 46 (Minn. 1990); Hoblyn v. Johnson, 55 P.3d
1219, 1225 (Wyo. 2002) (holding that the state of Wyoming does not recognize the tort of
intentional interference with parental rights); Sheltra v. Smith, 392 A.2d 431, 432–33 (Vt.
1978) (declining to recognize a separate tort for parental kidnapping and instead suggesting
that parents seek recovery under the tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress).
135
460 N.W.2d at 46.
131
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Evidence is piling up that children can be devastated by divorce, and their continuing
development can be detrimentally affected by subsequent events. For the good of our
children, the law should seek to promote such harmony as is possible in families
fractured by the dissolution process. . . . The interest in compensation should not
outweigh the effects of bitter accusations on young children. . . . [This tort] would
place innocent children in the middle of a vigorous, probably vicious, lawsuit between
136
their parents.

The court also added that creating a new tort would not actually deter
parental kidnapping because “[f]amily ties are normally stronger than the
fear of money damages.”137 Finally, the court concluded that a parent who
suffered from an especially egregious case of parental kidnapping should
instead seek recovery through the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, rather than the tort of custodial interference.138 Ultimately, the
Minnesota court concluded that the proper remedy for violation of a court
order “lies in contempt and other such sanctions; not in providing the other
party with compensation.”139
The Minnesota, Wyoming, and Vermont supreme courts agree that
recognizing a tort action for parental kidnapping does not provide a solution
to parental kidnapping.140 As the Larson court explained, creating a new
tort does not deter any parent who would gladly pay monetary damages in
order to maintain exclusive custody of the child.141 Ultimately, creating a
new tort for custodial interference provides an inadequate deterrent for
parental kidnappers.142
E. COURT-SPONSORED CUSTODY MEDIATION

Finally, courts may refer divorced parents to child-custody mediation
as a preventative measure in combating parental kidnapping.143
In an attempt to reduce child custody-related conflict between parents
after divorce, California courts use mandatory court-sponsored custody

136

Id. at 45–46.
Id. at 46.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 46; Sheltra v. Smith, 392 A.2d 431, 432–33 (Vt. 1978);
Hoblyn v. Johnson, 55 P.3d 1219, 1225 (Wyo. 2002).
141
Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 46–47.
142
Whether or not a state decides to recognize the tort of custodial interference does not
have any impact on double jeopardy analysis. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,
451 (1989). (“The protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause are not triggered by litigation
between private parties.”).
143
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 (requiring that all contested custody issues be mediated).
137

5. BRUMMEL

2016]

3/1/2017 5:55 PM

PARENTAL KIDNAPPING

335

mediation.144 In 1984, the California legislature passed a statute requiring
each superior court to supply a mediator that is professionally qualified; for
example, the mediator can be a staff member of a mental health agency,
probation department, or conciliation court.145 Furthermore, the California
system requires courts to separate the child custody mediation from the
parents’ divorce hearing, recognizing that although the parents’ relationship
with each other may be irreconcilable, they can still work together as coparents for their child’s best interests.146 Other states, such as Alaska, Iowa,
and Montana provide similar mediation or counseling before custody
determinations; however, the mediation generally occurs at the discretion of
the court.147
The California child custody mediation system provides three benefits
for post-divorce families.148 First, successful child custody mediation is
less expensive than litigation.149 Second, mediation is more likely to
salvage the relationship between the parents by avoiding “the appearance of
leaving one parent the winner and the other the loser,” as the process strives
to produce an outcome that satisfies both parties.150 Third, by minimizing
the chance for future hostilities between parents, a successful mediation
promotes the mental and emotional health of the child.151 Thus, proponents
of court-sponsored mediation argue that it deters parental kidnapping “by
reducing the number of its potential victims: children whose parents either
anticipate bitter custody litigation or who refuse to abide by the result of
such a battle.”152
144

Id.; see Guardianship of MS.W., 136 Cal. App. 3d 708, 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)
(explaining that the purpose of the mediation statute’s mandatory language is to reduce
conflict between parents).
145
Id.; CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607
146
See id.; CAL. CIV. CODE § 4609 (West 1985).
147
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.080 (1983) (holding that “the court may order the
parties to submit to mediation”); IOWA. CODE ANN. § 598.41(2)(d) (West 1985) (holding that
“unless the court determines that direct physical harm or significant emotional harm to the
child, other children, or a parent is likely to result, the court may require the parties to
participate in custody mediation to determine whether joint custody is in the best interest of
the child”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-3-124 (1985) (giving courts the power to appoint a
“conciliation counselor” who is qualified by training and experience in personal counseling
to hold “conciliation conferences” with parties to settle custody disputes).
148
Bentch, supra note 42, at 389–90.
149
Id. at 389.
150
Id. at 389–90.
151
Id. at 390.
152
Id. at 391. Since adopting court-sponsored mediation, Los Angeles county courts
have experienced a 75% reduction in the number of custody cases adjudicated. Id. at 388
n.153.
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Although mediation sounds like an ideal solution, it may prove
unworkable in some custody disputes and invariably lead to litigation.153
Some ex-spouses may be unable to successfully mediate due to
vindictiveness and deceitfulness.154 Similarly, feelings of mistrust and
hostility between former couples may be too strong for a productive
mediation session, despite a good faith attempt to work out their issues.155
Ultimately, although mandatory custody mediation may be helpful in
preventing parental kidnapping in some cases, it is an incomplete solution.
In situations where mediation is insufficient and a parent resorts to
kidnapping, criminal contempt sanctions and state criminal statutes are still
necessary to punish and deter parental kidnapping.
III. THE PROBLEM OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE
This section lays out the history of the double jeopardy rule in
American jurisprudence, followed by an analysis of how the double
jeopardy rule affects the interaction between criminal contempt sanctions
and prosecutions for parental kidnapping.
A. HISTORY OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE

The double jeopardy rule finds its roots in the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no
person shall be “subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb.”156 Under the double jeopardy rule, an individual is protected
from successive prosecutions and punishments for the same crime.157
The history of double jeopardy jurisprudence can be traced back to the
U.S. Supreme Court’s establishment of the “same elements” test in
Blockburger v. United States.158 The Blockburger test holds that where “the
153

Id. (citing King, Handling Custody and Visitation Disputes Under the New
Mandatory Mediation Law, 2 CAL. LAW. 40, 41 (1982) (concluding that mediation does not
resolve all custody disputes)).
154
Id. at 391 (citing JOAN BLADES, FAMILY MEDIATION: COOPERATIVE DIVORCE
SETTLEMENT 4 (1985)).
155
Id. (citing DONALD T. SAPOSNEK, MEDIATING CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES 217 (1983)).
156
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
157
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 729 (1969) (“By forbidding that no person
shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, the safeguard
of the Fifth Amendment against double punishment guarded against the repetition of history
by punishing a man for an offense when he had already suffered the punishment for it”)
(quoting Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 276 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
158
284 U.S. 299; see 1932 Harvard Law Review Association, Double Jeopardy—
Substantive Criminal Charges Following a Finding of Criminal Contempt, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 144, 144 (1993).

5. BRUMMEL

2016]

3/1/2017 5:55 PM

PARENTAL KIDNAPPING

337

same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two
offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact
which the other does not.”159 Subsequently, in Grady v. Corbin,160 the
Court held that in addition to passing the “same elements” test of
Blockburger, the subsequent prosecutions must also satisfy the “same
conduct” test: the government must attempt to prove conduct that
constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been
prosecuted.161
However, a mere three years later in United States v. Dixon,162 the U.S.
Supreme Court overruled the Grady “same conduct” test and announced a
return to the Blockburger “same elements” test.163 In Dixon, the Court held
that double jeopardy prevented the state from prosecuting the defendant for
assaulting his wife because he had already been held in criminal contempt
of court for violating a civil protection order prohibiting simple assault.164
However, the Court also held that several other counts brought by the state
against the defendant were not barred under the double jeopardy rule,
because the other counts required different elements of proof.165 For
example, “assault with intent to kill” requires proof of specific intent to kill,
whereas the crime of simple assault does not.166 Thus, the Court held that
the defendant could still be prosecuted for assault with intent to kill without
violating the double jeopardy rule.167 Today, the Blockburger same
elements test still governs the application of the double jeopardy rule.168
B. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF COURT AND
PARENTAL KIDNAPPING

Domestic violence activists celebrated the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Dixon for refusing to protect violators of civil protection orders

159
Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 (citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342
(1911)).
160
495 U.S. 508 (1990).
161
Id. at 522.
162
509 U.S. 688 (1993).
163
Id. at 701–04 (determining that the “subsequent prosecution for assault fails the
Blockburger test, and is barred” under the double jeopardy rule).
164
Id. at 700.
165
Id. at 700–01.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 703.
168
Boyd v. Boughton, 798 F.3d 490, 500–01 (7th Cir. 2015) (applying Dixon and the
Blockburger “same elements” test to a defendant’s double jeopardy claim).
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from subsequent criminal prosecution for assault or domestic violence.169
However, the Court has yet to address whether Dixon similarly applies to
child custody orders and criminal prosecution for parental kidnapping.
Recall that the double jeopardy rule prohibits multiple prosecutions for
the same criminal offense.170 Both criminal contempt of court and parental
kidnapping are crimes in all fifty states.171 A child custody order that may
be enforced by criminal contempt and criminal prosecution raises a
constitutional question: when a parent is guilty of criminal contempt of
court for violating a child custody order, does the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment prohibit the state from subsequently prosecuting
that parent for parental kidnapping?172
Some states, such as Illinois, have applied the double jeopardy rule to
protect a criminal contemnor from subsequent prosecution for parental
kidnapping.173 For example, in In re Marriage of D’Attomo, the court held
that violating a child custody order constitutes the same offense as child
abduction under the Blockburger same elements test: “[S]ince the child
abduction statute is defined in such a way as to criminalize the violation of
a custody order by the removal or concealment of a child, such offense is
the same as the indirect criminal contempt charge in the pending case.”174
As applied to the defendant’s specific situation, the court held that the
defendant’s violation of the custody order stemmed from the same act of
removing the child from the jurisdiction, such that he only committed “one,
continuing act of contempt and not several, distinct acts.”175
Other states like Ohio have rejected defendants’ double jeopardy
arguments.176 For example, in State v. Kimbler,177 the Ohio appellate court
applied the Blockburger same elements test and concluded that the double
jeopardy rule should not apply.178
The Kimbler court first explained that under the Ohio parental
169

See Jennifer Black, The Double Jeopardy Dilemma in Combating Domestic
Violence: A Solution in United States v. Dixon, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 911, 926 (1995).
170
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 733 (1969).
171
Bentch, supra note 42, at 378; Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968).
172
See Zitter, supra note 8, at 950.
173
See In re Marriage of D’Attomo, 570 N.E.2d 796, 796 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); People v.
Rodriguez, 514 N.E.2d 1033, 1037–38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); People v. Howard, 686 P.2d 644,
649 (Cal. 1984); State v. Hope, 449 So.2d 633, 636 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
174
In re Marriage of D’Attomo, 570 N.E.2d at 802.
175
Id.
176
Eva J. Klain, Judges’ Guide to Criminal Parental Kidnapping Cases, 48 JUV. & FAM.
CT. J. 49, 2-15 (1997).
177
509 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
178
Id. at 104.
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kidnapping statute, the prosecution need only show that the defendant, “by
any means and with purpose to withhold a minor from the legal custody of
his parent,” removed the child “from the place where he is found.”179 The
prosecution does not need to prove the violation of a court order for a
conviction under state parental kidnapping laws, only the existence of a
court order:
“While [proof of a violation of a court order] might tend to prove the purpose of the
taking of the children so as to supply that element of the crime of child stealing, in
connection with that offense it is unnecessary to prove violation of a court order.
Rather, the existence of the court order will be relevant only to prove who had legal
180
custody of the child.”

In contrast, the court held that the prosecution did not need to prove
any of the elements of child stealing for a charge of criminal contempt for
violating a court order involving custody.181 Under Ohio’s criminal
contempt of court statute, the court may punish any person “guilty of
misbehavior in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct
the administration of justice.”182 Ohio’s criminal contempt statute further
provides a list of examples of acts that may be punished for contempt,
including “disobedience of, or resistance to, a lawful writ, process, order,
rule, judgment, or command of a court.”183 In the event of a parental
kidnapping, the defendant must violate a court-issued custody order to be
held in criminal contempt of court.184 Accordingly, the Kimbler court
concluded:
[A]lthough the same conduct may result both in criminal contempt and a violation of
[the state criminal statute], they do not constitute the same offense for double jeopardy
purposes since conviction for violation of the statute requires proof of facts not

179

Id. at 103–04 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.04 (West 2015)).
Id. at 104.
181
Id. at 103–04. Ohio’s statute criminalizing parental kidnapping reads: “No person,
by any means and with purpose to withhold a minor from the legal custody of his parent,
guardian, or custodian, shall remove the minor from the place where he is found.” OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2905.04 (West 2015). The court concluded, “None of the elements of this
offense need be proved in connection with a charge of criminal contempt for violating a
court order involving custody, such as herein involved.” Kimbler, 509 N.E.2d at 104. The
Ohio state legislature later repealed § 2905.04; however, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.23
(West 2016) criminalizes interference with custody as a misdemeanor or a felony, depending
on whether the child is removed from the state and whether the child suffers physical harm
as a result of the kidnapping: “No person, knowing the person is without privilege to do so or
being reckless in that regard, shall entice, take, keep, or harbor . . . from the parent, guardian,
or custodian of . . . [a] child under the age of eighteen.” Id. at § 2919.23(A)(1).
182
Id. at 103 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2705.01 (West 2015)).
183
Id. (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2705.01 (West 2015)).
184
Id.
180
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required to be proven for a conviction of criminal contempt and conviction of criminal
185
contempt requires proof of facts not required to prove a violation of the statute.

Therefore, the court held that parental kidnapping and criminal contempt of
court do not share the same elements and therefore should not be considered
the same crime for double jeopardy purposes.
Furthermore, the court pointed out that criminalizing contempt of court
serves a different purpose than criminalizing parental kidnapping:
“the criminal statute involved . . . is not concerned with preventing or punishing
obstructions of the administration of justice but, instead, is designed to prevent child
stealing, that is, the taking of a child from the person having legal custody of the
186
child, whether taken by a noncustodial parent or a third person.”

Therefore, the court held that the defendant’s prior conviction of criminal
contempt does not bar the state’s ability to prosecute him for kidnapping.187
For the reasons outlined below, courts should follow Ohio’s example
rather than Illinois’s, and hold that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
protect criminal contemnors from subsequent criminal prosecution under
state parental kidnapping laws.
IV. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE SHOULD NOT PROTECT CRIMINAL
CONTEMNORS FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR PARENTAL KIDNAPPING
The double jeopardy rule should not protect criminal contemnors from
subsequent criminal prosecution for parental kidnapping under applicable
state court laws for three reasons. First, criminal contempt of court does not
contain the same elements as parental kidnapping, so the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not apply. Second, allowing a conviction for criminal
contempt of court to prevent prosecution under state criminal laws can lead
to inconsistent results. Finally, sanctions for criminal contempt of court do
not adequately punish parental kidnappers, considering the serious and
harmful consequences of the crime. Therefore, courts should allow the
state to prosecute defendants for parental kidnapping, regardless of any
prior proceedings for criminal contempt of court.
A. CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF COURT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SAME
ELEMENTS AS PARENTAL KIDNAPPING

Criminal contempt of court for violating a child custody order does not
contain the same elements as child kidnapping for the purposes of double
jeopardy.
185
186
187

Id.
Id.
Id. at 104.
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As mentioned above, the combination of parental kidnapping and
criminal contempt fails the Blockburger same elements test. Criminal
contempt of court contains an element requiring the existence of a court
order. The contempt offense disrespects state family courts by disobeying
their decrees and interfering with their ability to regulate parenting behavior
in the child’s best interests. At common law, criminal contempt was used
by courts to sanction conduct that “interfered with the orderly
administration of judicial proceedings.”188 This common law power is now
codified in the United States Code as the “power to punish by fine or
imprisonment, or both, at its discretion . . . [d]isobedience or resistance to
its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.189 Accordingly, a
prosecution for criminal contempt requires the state to prove that the parent
violated a court order.
In contrast, the parental kidnapping offense does not always require
proof of a court-issued custody order as an element of the crime.190
Parental kidnapping punishes any actor who kidnaps a child and deprives a
parent of her legal right to custody of her child.191 Criminal statutes on
kidnapping make it unlawful for a person to (1) take a child (2) with the
intent to detain or conceal the child from her lawful custodian.192 In
188

United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 694 (1992).
18 U.S.C. § 401 (2002). While contempt powers under § 401 also authorizes the
court to punish “[m]isbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct
the administration of justice” and “[m]isbehavior of any of its officers in their official
transactions,” parental kidnapping does not fall under either of these categories. Instead,
criminal contempt sanctions against parental kidnappers fall under the court’s power to
punish “disobedience.” For examples of misbehavior that obstructs the administration of
justice, see, e.g., United States v. Landes, 97 F.2d 378, 379–81 (2d Cir. 1938) (holding that
an attorney who refused to take his seat although ordered to do so by judge was properly
found guilty of contempt of court); see also United States v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 820, 820 (7th
Cir. 1996) (holding that an attorney who attempted three times to ask question of witness
that judge had prohibited was properly found guilty of contempt of court).
190
See, e.g., Strother v. State, 1 P.2d 214, 217–18 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995); State v.
Donahue, 680 P.2d 191, 192 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
191
Klain, supra note 176, at 1-2.
192
Johnson, supra note 2, at 823 (“Criminal statutes on kidnapping, or related crimes,
generally make it unlawful for a person to take a child with the intent to detain and conceal
such child from a parent or other lawful custodian.”); see, e.g., State v. Kracker, 599 P.2d
250, 252 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming a conviction for child stealing where mother had
admitted she had taken and concealed son from father who had legal custody of the child by
decree of court in divorce proceedings); People v. Hyatt, 18 Cal. App. 3d 618, 622–23 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1971) (affirming a conviction for child stealing where father used his visitation
privileges to take children from mother in whose charge they had been placed by
interlocutory decree in divorce proceedings and left the state with the children, not to be
found for over two years); People v. Harrison, 402 N.E.2d 822, 824 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(affirming a conviction for child abduction where father picked up children while exercising
189
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contrast, the court may hold a parent in criminal contempt as long as they
disobeyed a court order, even if he had no such intent to detain and conceal
the child.193 Likewise, a parent may be charged with parental kidnapping
even without the existence of a court order.194
For example, in Strother v. State,195 the Court of Appeals of Alaska
explained that to prove the crime of custodial interference, the State had to
establish three elements: (1) that the defendant—here, the child’s father—
took, enticed, or kept the child from a lawful custodian, (2) that the
defendant intended to hold the child for a protracted period of time, and (3)
that the father knew he had no legal right to take the child.196 The court
then explained even in the absence of a custody order, the defendant could
be convicted for custodial interference because his actions of “secretly
removing and hiding his daughter, keeping the child from his wife and
refusing to disclose the child’s location, epitomize[d] the conduct that the
custodial interference statutes prohibit.”197 Based on the defendant’s
actions, his knowledge that he had no legal right to engage in these actions,
and his intent to hold the child for a protracted period, the Strother court
held that “persons of ordinary understanding would have no trouble
concluding that the [defendant] has committed the crime of custodial
interference.”198
The Arizona Court of Appeals came to a similar conclusion in State v.
Donahue,199 holding that even in the absence of a court decree defining the
respective custody rights of the two parents, the state can still convict a
defendant for custodial interference.200 A Delaware court has similarly held

visitation rights then took the children away in the nighttime to another state without
disclosing his destination to mother, not to be found for over one month).
193
State v. Kimbler, 509 N.E.2d 99, 103–04 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
194
Id.; see also Strother, 1 P.2d at 217–18.
195
1 P.2d 214 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
196
Id. at 217.
197
Id. at 226.
198
Id.
199
680 P.2d 191 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
200
Id. at 193 (finding the defendant, an unwed father who had abducted the child from
the mother, guilty of custodial interference even though no official custody order existed
between the unwed father and mother of the child because “his right was at most a right to
co-equal custody with the child’s natural mother [and he] did not have the right to custody of
the child to the exclusion of the mother”); see also State v. Wood, 8 P.3d 1189, 1191–92
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that father who took son to another state without mother’s
knowledge or consent could be charged with custodial interference, even though mother had
not yet filed her petition for dissolution of marriage and for temporary custody of son prior
to father taking son out of state).
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in State v. Todd201 that a child’s natural father could be convicted of
custodial interference, even though no valid custody order existed.202
Ultimately, because the state must prove different elements to prosecute a
parent for criminal contempt of court compared to parental kidnapping, the
double jeopardy rule does not apply under the Blockburger same elements
test.
B. CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF COURT DIFFERS SIGNIFICANTLY FROM
THE CRIME OF PARENTAL KIDNAPPING

In Albernaz v. United States,203 the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the
Blockburger same elements test is a “rule of statutory construction, and
because it serves as a means of discerning congressional purpose the rule
should not be controlling where, for example, there is a clear indication of
contrary legislative intent.”204 In addition to containing different elements,
criminal contempt of court contains other significant differences compared
to the crime of parental kidnapping. Accordingly, if a state court is
convinced that the legislature intended for criminal contempt and parental
kidnapping to constitute two different offenses to which double jeopardy
should not apply, the court may authorize multiple punishment for a single
act.205 The numerous and significant differences between criminal
contempt and parental kidnapping demonstrate that many state legislatures
may have intended to punish parental kidnappers for both contempt and the
crime of parental kidnapping. Accordingly, state courts should not apply
the Double Jeopardy Clause to protect criminal contemnors from a
subsequent prosecution for criminal contempt.
First, criminalizing contempt of court serves a fundamentally different
purpose than criminalizing parental kidnapping. Although both criminal
contempt and ordinary criminal laws serve to protect the institutions of
government and the enforcement of governmental mandates, contempt is a
unique crime because the judge is so personally affected.206 As the U.S.
201

509 A.2d 1112 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986).
Id. at 1113–14 (finding the defendant, an unwed father who had abducted the child
from the mother, guilty of custodial interference because Delaware law delineates rights and
responsibilities between natural parents even where no valid custody order exists).
203
450 U.S. 333 (1981).
204
Id. at 340.
205
McAninch, supra note 18, at 448 (“The Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than
prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature
intended. The Blockburger test is a guide, and no more than that, to ascertaining whether the
legislature intended to authorize multiple punishment for a single act.”).
206
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201–02 (1968) (expressing that contempt “strikes at
the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge’s temperament.”).
202
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Supreme Court held in Bloom v. Illinois, “[e]ven when the contempt is not a
direct insult to the court or the judge, it frequently represents a rejection of
judicial authority, or an interference with the judicial process or with the
duties of officers of the court.”207
In contrast, legislatures criminalize parental kidnapping in order to
punish and deter such conduct, which in turn protects potential child
victims and keeps families intact.208 For example, California titled its 2002
statute criminalizing parental kidnapping the Synclair-Cannon Act after its
author, Larry Synclair.209 Synclair, whose son was a victim of parental
kidnapping on three separate occasions, drafted the bill to alert California
courts to the “red flags of child abduction” and protect the “left-behind
parent’s fundamental and constitutional right to the care, custody and
control of the child.”210 When the court protects a contemnor from
prosecution for child kidnapping, the judicial system sends the wrong
message that parental kidnapping is nothing more than a crime of disrespect
against the court. Because criminal contempt of court serves a different
purpose than the crime of parental kidnapping, the two are not the same
crime.
In addition, criminal contempt of court is categorized differently than
parental kidnapping. Criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401 is a sui
generis offense, not classifiable as a felony or a misdemeanor for
sentencing purposes.211 As the Eleventh Circuit held in Cohn, this
separateness “appropriately reflects the differences between criminal

207

Id. at 202.
See State Dep’t of Human Res. ex rel Johnson v. Bail, 938 P.2d 209, 213 (Or. 1997)
(“Punishment of a parent’s past misconduct and deterrence of potential misconduct by others
in the future are functions of the criminal law, which prohibits custodial interference.”);
Hicks v. State, 12 S.W.2d 385, 386 (Tenn. 1928) (“[Tennessee’s statute criminalizing
parental kidnapping] was intended to protect parental and other lawful custody of children
against the greed and malice of the kidnapper.”); Foster-Zahid v. Virginia, 477 S.E.2d 759,
762 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (“The underlying policy for [Virginia’s statute criminalizing
parental kidnapping] is to deter, if not prevent, child snatching.”); Patricia M. Hoff, Parental
Kidnapping: Prevention and Remedies, A.B.A. CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, (Dec.
2000),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/child/PublicDocuments/
pkprevrem.authcheckdam.pdf (“All fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Congress have
enacted civil and criminal laws to address parental kidnapping.”).
209
SYNCLAIR-CANNON CHILD ABDUCTION PREVENTION ACT, 2002 CAL. STATS. 856
(2002).
210
The Synclair-Cannon Child Abduction Prevention Act of 2002, LARRY SYNCLAIR JR.
ABDUCTED TO RUSSIA OVER TEN YEARS AGO, http://abducted-larrysynclairjr.weebly.com/
synclair-cannon-act.html.
211
United States v. Cohn, 586 F.3d 844, 848–49 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Cheff v.
Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966)).
208
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contempt and the traditional crimes. . . . ”212 In contrast, state criminal
statutes punish parental kidnapping as a misdemeanor or a felony.213 Most
states, including Texas, Illinois, and Michigan, immediately label such
criminal conduct as a felony,214 while other states, such as Alaska and
Nebraska, punish parental kidnapping as a misdemeanor.215 There are also
some states, such as Missouri and Pennsylvania, where parental kidnapping
within the state is a misdemeanor, while removal of the child out of state
constitutes a felony.216 Regardless of the state, the crime of parental
kidnapping is treated as either a misdemeanor or a felony, unlike criminal
contempt.217
Furthermore, the procedure of prosecuting criminal contempt is
different than that of prosecuting parental kidnapping. For example, the
U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that criminal contempt does not
always require the right to a jury trial. In Taylor v. Hayes,218 the Court held
that where the contemnor’s punishment amounts to less than six months of
imprisonment, he has only been convicted of “petty contempt” and has no
right to a jury trial.219 The Court further stated that courts are permitted,
after conviction, to reduce a contemnor’s sentence to less than six months to
avoid a jury trial: “a State may choose to try any contempt without a jury if
it determines not to impose a sentence longer than six months.”220 In
contrast, the jury plays an integral role in the prosecution of child
kidnapping in several states, such as Oklahoma and Nevada.221
212

Id. at 849.
See generally NDAA Parental Kidnapping Compilation, supra note 60.
214
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.10 (West 2010) (“An offense under this section is a
state jail felony”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5 (2010) (“A person convicted of child
abduction under this Section is guilty of a Class 4 felony”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
750.350(a) (West 2004) (“A parent who violates [this section] is guilty of a felony.”). See
generally NDAA Parental Kidnapping Compilation, supra note 60.
215
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.41.330 (West 2010); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-316 (West
2010). Alaska state law punishes kidnapping less severely where the actor is the parent of
the victim, compared to where the actor is unrelated to the victim. Although the former is
only a class A misdemeanor, the latter is a class C felony. Compare ALASKA STAT. §
11.41.330 with ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.41.320.
216
MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.150 (West 2010); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2904
(West 2010).
217
See generally NDAA Parental Kidnapping Compilation, supra note 60.
218
418 U.S. 488 (1974).
219
Id. at 495; see also Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970); Frank v. United
States, 395 U.S. 147, 148–50 (1969).
220
Taylor, 418 U.S at 496.
221
See OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21 § 891 (West 2010) (“Except for persons sentenced to
life or life without parole, any person sentenced to imprisonment for two (2) years or more
for a violation of this section [titled Child Stealing] . . . shall be required to serve a term of
213
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Ultimately, the many significant differences between criminal
contempt of court and parental kidnapping suggest that state legislatures did
not intend for the Double Jeopardy Clause to protect criminal contemnors
from subsequent prosecution under state parental kidnapping statutes.
Therefore, state courts should uphold the intent of the legislature in treating
criminal contempt and parental kidnapping as separate offenses for double
jeopardy purposes.
C. CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF COURT DOES NOT CONSISTENTLY
PUNISH PARENTAL KIDNAPPING

Courts should hold that the double jeopardy rule does apply to protect
criminal contemnors from subsequent prosecution for parental kidnapping
because sanctions for criminal contempt do not consistently punish parental
kidnapping. Holding a parent in criminal contempt fails to communicate
the seriousness of his crime; instead, state criminal statutes, which classify
parental kidnapping as a misdemeanor or even a felony, serve as a more
effective punishment and deterrent. Furthermore, although sanctions for
criminal contempt of court remain unregulated and virtually limitless, state
criminal statutes provide guidelines to ensure consistent and adequate
punishments.222 Ultimately, if criminal contemnors are protected by the
Double Jeopardy Clause from subsequent prosecution under state parental
kidnapping statutes, they will not receive an adequate punishment.
Little regulation exists to ensure consistent sanctions for criminal
contempt. The court has a great deal of discretion when determining
sanctions for criminal contempt, based on how much the judge believes the
parent should be punished for his or her act of disrespect.223 Although the
typical sanction for contempt is fine or jail time, alternative sanctions
include suspending the violating parent’s driver’s license, ordering that
makeup parenting time be provided for the non-violating parent, or
modifying the custody order.224 Furthermore, there is often no minimum or
maximum limit on the sanctions a judge can impose for contempt of
post-imprisonment supervision False The jury shall be advised that the mandatory postimprisonment supervision shall be in addition to the actual imprisonment”); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 200.350 (West 2009) (“Upon the trial for violation of [this statute outlawing child
kidnapping the consent thereto of the person kidnaped or confined shall not be a defense
unless it appears satisfactorily to the jury that such person was above the age of 18 years and
that the person’s consent was not extorted by threats, duress or fraud.”).
222
See generally NDAA Parental Kidnapping Compilation, supra note 60.
223
See United States v. Cohn, 586 F.3d 844, 849 (11th Cir. 2009) (describing “the scope
of § 401 and the wide range of sentences that may be imposed for its violation”).
224
Mahoney, supra note 1, at 856–57. The list of remedies usually does not include an
outright denial of custody rights to the violating parent. Id.
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court.225 As a result, the potential for abuse of the contempt power is
readily apparent. Justice Black criticizes the contempt power as too
discretionary in Green v. United States:
[Contempt is] an anomaly in the law . . . perhaps, nearest akin to the despotic power
of any power existing under our form of government . . . a drastic and pervasive mode
of administering criminal justice usurping our regular constitutional methods of trying
226
those charged with offenses against society.

In contrast, state statutes criminalizing parental kidnapping provide
sentencing guidelines to ensure consistency, predictability, and adequacy in
punishments across all courts within the same jurisdiction.227 For example,
Maryland’s statute sets specific tiers of punishment, based on the gravity of
the parental kidnapping incident.228 If the child is out of the custody of the
lawful custodian for thirty or fewer days but not removed from the state, the
punishment is a felony conviction and a fine not exceeding $1,000 or
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both.229 If the child is out of the
custody of the lawful custodian for more than thirty days but not removed
from the state, the punishment is a felony conviction and a fine not
exceeding $2,500 or imprisonment not exceeding three years, or both.230
However, if the child is taken out of the state in a parental kidnapping
incident, the punishment is a felony conviction and a fine not exceeding
$5,000 or imprisonment not exceeding five years, or both.231 Unlike the
wide variety of sanctions a judge could impose as punishment for criminal
contempt,232 state criminal laws provide guidance to ensure consistent
punishments for parental kidnapping.
Furthermore, several states severely restrict the sanctions that a judge
may impose for criminal contempt so that criminal contemnors always
225
Grote, supra note 108, at 1248 (citing Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the
Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79
VA. L. REV. 1025, 1026–28 (1993) (describing the power of contempt as both “vast and
unlimited” and any judge using the contempt power “suffer[s] from an obvious and
ineradicable conflict of interest”)). For example, in Illinois, there is no maximum penalty for
criminal contempt of court. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968) (citing People v.
Stollar, 201 N.E.2d 97, 99 (1964)).
226
356 U.S. 165, 193–94 (1957) (citing State ex rel. Ashbaugh v. Circuit Court, 72
N.W. 193, 194–95) (Black, J., dissenting).
227
See generally NDAA Parental Kidnapping Compilation, supra note 60.
228
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-307 (West 2010).
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Some states, such as Massachusetts and Nebraska, have no limits on criminal
contempt penalties. Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REV. 345,
407 at n.379 (2000).
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receive a lesser punishment than they would if they were prosecuted for the
crime of parental kidnapping.233 For example, in Arkansas, criminal
contempt is a class C misdemeanor, which has a maximum sanction of 30
days imprisonment.234 However, if a parent is prosecuted under Arkansas
criminal laws for parental kidnapping, he will be charged with a class A
misdemeanor, which is punishable by up to one year in prison.235 Similarly,
Pennsylvania’s statutes limit sanctions for criminal contempt of court to a
fine of up to $100 or imprisonment for up to thirty days.236 In contrast, a
parent convicted of parental kidnapping in Pennsylvania faces
imprisonment for up to seven years.237 Finally, under California statutes,
the maximum penalty for criminal contempt is five days of imprisonment
and a $1,000 fine, but the maximum penalty for parental kidnapping is four
years in prison.238
Fierro v. State239 provides another example of the disparity between a
sentence for criminal contempt of court and a sentence under a state
parental kidnapping law. In Fierro, although the parents’ divorce
proceedings were still pending, the court had issued a temporary custody
order providing for shared parental custody and set forth a schedule for the
parents to follow.240 The temporary order also prohibited the parents from
taking the child outside of the Second Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida
without obtaining the written consent of the other party.241 However, the
father violated the temporary order by failing to return the three-year-old
son to the mother as required by the order.242 Fourteen months later, the
child was found living with the father in South Carolina.243 The court held
the father in criminal contempt and sentenced him to six months in jail.244
233

See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16–10–108 (West 1987) (limiting sanctions for criminal
contempt of court to a $50 fine or imprisonment for no more than ten days); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1218(a) (West 1982) (limiting sanctions for criminal contempt of court to a $1,000
fine or imprisonment for no more than five days, or both); 42 PA. STAT AND CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 4137(c) (West 1995) (limiting sanctions for criminal contempt of court to a $100 fine
or imprisonment for no more than thirty days, or both).
234
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16–10–108 (West 1987).
235
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5–26–502(a) (West 2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5–4–401(a)(3)
(West 2016).
236
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 4137(c) (West 2016).
237
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 1103(3) (West 2016).
238
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1218(a) (West 2007); CAL. PENAL CODE § 278 (West 4).
239
653 So. 2d 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
240
Id. at 448–49.
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id.
244
Id.
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Subsequently, the state of Florida attempted to charge the father for
violating section 787.04 of the Florida Statutes, which prohibits the
concealing or removing of a minor child contrary to a court order.245 Even
though the jury found the father guilty and sentenced him to five years of
probation, the Florida appellate court found that double jeopardy protected
the father from sanctions under the state criminal statute because he had
already served a sentence for criminal contempt.246
Carlson similarly demonstrates the potential disparity between
sanctions for criminal contempt and the sentencing guidelines of the
applicable state criminal statute.247 In Carlson, the judge held a parent in
criminal contempt for violation of a child custody order and decided that
the sanction would be incarceration for five hours, “until 5:00 p.m. that
day.”248 Compare this punishment with the one suggested by Georgia’s
state criminal statute outlawing parental kidnapping, which holds that a
person convicted of the misdemeanor of interference with custody shall be
fined not less than $200.00 and not more than $500.00, or shall be
imprisoned for not less than one month and not more than five months, or
both.249 Thus, another parent in Georgia who effectively commits the same
crime as Carlson could face a much harsher punishment: if the government
prosecuted him under Georgia’s criminal statute, the result would be at least
a $200 fine or a month of imprisonment.
These examples demonstrate that applying the double jeopardy rule to
parental kidnapping cases can lead to senselessly disparate results.
Although the wide discretion judges have in punishing criminal contempt
may allow harsher punishments for parental kidnapping, the reduced
discretion of state parental kidnapping statutes fosters consistency in
sentencing, which leads to greater deterrence.250 Therefore, courts should
hold that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect criminal contemnors
from subsequent prosecution under state criminal statutes for parental
kidnapping.

245

Id. at 447–48 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 787.04 (West 2016)).
Id. at 447.
247
748 S.E.2d 304, 304 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).
248
Id. at 306.
249
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-45(2)(A) (West 2016).
250
See Mirko Bagaric, Consistency and Fairness in Sentencing—The Splendor of Fixed
Penalties, 2 CAL. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 11 (2000) (explaining the empirical flaws in the argument
that disproportionate punishments reduce the crime rate through deterrence).
246
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D. CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF COURT DOES NOT ADEQUATELY PUNISH
PARENTAL KIDNAPPING

Finally, courts should not allow the double jeopardy rule to protect
criminal contemnors from subsequent prosecution for parental kidnapping
because contempt is not an adequate punishment considering the gravity of
their crime. Parental kidnapping leads to significant harms for both the
custodial parent and the child, and such conduct should be punished
accordingly.251
First, parental kidnapping results in harm to the child. The child
suffers emotional and psychological damage from being suddenly uprooted
and forcibly taken from their custodial parent.252 This damage may increase
after the child is found and uprooted once again, in order to be returned to
the original custodial parent.253 In addition, the kidnapping parent may
force the child to continually move from place to place to evade the other
parent or law enforcement officials looking for the missing child.254 As a
result, many kidnapped children fail to receive adequate education or
adequate medical care and live in substandard housing.255
Furthermore, 75% of victims of parental kidnapping are six years old
or younger.256 Most child development experts agree that personality is
formed prior to the age of six.257 Therefore, the abduction of a young child
has a significant influence on whom he or she becomes.258 In an interview
with the International Centre for Family Law, Policy, and Practice, one
victim of parental kidnapping said, “I feel that the core of me has been
shattered . . . I have an internal conflict between my natural . . . personality
and the personality that has been formed as a consequence of these
experiences.”259 Other victims expressed feelings of isolation and low self251

See Greif, supra note 20 (“[R]eactions to abduction include: nightmares, fears of
doors and windows, bedwetting (depending on age), fear of authority and strangers, anger at
abductor and left-behind parent, depression, anxiety, and school and peer problems.
Problems for many adults persist into their 20s, 30s, 40s, and 50s.”).
252
Id.
253
WASHINGTON COURTS, supra note 20 (“If the child is very young when abducted and
is returned as an older child, the child may suffer serious negative emotional effects because
the child feels as if he or she is returned to a stranger, and therefore the return to the parent
who was originally left behind seems like an abduction itself.”).
254
Georgia K. Hilgeman, Impact of Family Child Abduction, CALIFORNIA CHILD
ABDUCTION TASK FORCE, (Aug. 27, 2001), http://www.childabductions.org/impact2.html.
255
WASHINGTON COURTS, supra note 20.
256
Hilgeman, supra note 254.
257
Id.
258
Id.
259
Marilyn Freeman, Parental Child Abduction: The Long-Term Effects,

5. BRUMMEL

2016]

3/1/2017 5:55 PM

PARENTAL KIDNAPPING

351

worth, problems with attachment, security, and mistrust, and lack of
emotion.260 Finally, abducted children may be told by the kidnapping
parent that the left-behind parent did not want them or that the left-behind
parent is dead, resulting in feelings of loss and grief, as well as long-term
emotional scars.261
Also, during a parental kidnapping incident, the custodial parent
suffers a violation of her legal right to custody and the resulting absence of
the child.262 The custodial parent’s anguish over her missing child can lead
to long-term emotional and physical problems.263 Also, custodial parents
spend an average of $20,000 trying to locate and regain custody of their
kidnapped children.264 Furthermore, along with the stress of worrying
about their missing child, many parents must deal with the possibility that
their missing child may never be located.265 At least 20% of children
kidnapped by the other parent are never found.266 Thus, the custodial parent
may suffer emotional, physical, and financial harm as a result of the other
parent’s choice to kidnap his child.267
Considering the severe and numerous harms experienced by parents
and children as a result of parental kidnapping, parents guilty of such
conduct should not be able to escape criminal liability under state laws
simply because a judge has sanctioned them with criminal contempt of
court. The district court in United States v. Mirra268 warned against this
very outcome, when it declined to apply the double jeopardy rule to protect
a criminal contemnor.269 In Mirra, the court allowed the state to prosecute a
defendant for criminal assault even though he had already been held in
contempt of court for throwing a chair at the Assistant United States
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR FAMILY LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE, (Dec. 5, 2014),
http://childcentre.info/public/PROTECT/Research_report_web_1.12.14_R.pdf.
260
Id.
261
Hilgeman, supra note 254; WASHINGTON COURTS, supra note 20.
262
Mahoney, supra note 1, at 836.
263
Psychological Impact of Abduction, NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE
SERVICE, https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/190074/page6.html. Studies showed that the
left-behind parent harbored feelings of loss, rage, loneliness, and fear, and d impaired sleep,
loss of appetite, or severe depression. Furthermore, these negative feelings and effects did
not automatically cease upon the return of the abducted child; on the contrary, many parents
expressed that their psychological distress actually increased after reuniting with their child,
due to the stress of reunion and lingering concerns about re-abduction. Id.
264
Campbell, supra note 52, at 232.
265
Id.
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
220 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
269
Id. at 366–67.
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Attorney during trial.270 The court reasoned:
Let us consider by way of illustration the consequences of upholding Mirra’s claim in
the context of an extreme but not wholly improbable case that could have arisen after,
and out of, Mirra’s contempt conviction. Assume that Mirra’s projectile had received
more accurate a propulsion and had scored on its intended target—the Assistant
United States Attorney. And assume further the grisly and morbid fact that the
Assistant United States Attorney had sustained an injury which ultimately proved
fatal. To sustain Mirra’s [double jeopardy] claim would, in effect, grant a summary
271
contemnor immunity from a homicide prosecution—an unconscionable result.

In the same way, to sustain a double jeopardy claim to protect a parental
kidnapper simply because a judge has already held her in criminal contempt
leads to inadequate punishment and an unconscionable result.
Furthermore, contempt sanctions are often relatively mild.272 In light
of the enduring emotional and psychological damage that parental
kidnapping causes, a maximum punishment of five days imprisonment or a
fine of $50 seems hardly sufficient to punish and deter a parent from
kidnapping his own child.273 As Joy M. Feinberg274 observes, contempt
sanctions are often “inadequate and do not serve as a deterrent to custody or
visitation interference.”275 Allowing the state to prosecute parental
kidnappers under state criminal laws leads to increased punishments for this
serious crime, better protecting custodial parents and children from future
abductions.276 Furthermore, sanctions for criminal contempt do not compel
the violating parent to return his child to the custodial parent.277 In contrast,
state criminal law provisions often include instructions requiring the child
270

Id. at 366.
Id.
272
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16–10–108 (West 2016); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
1218(a) (West 2007); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 4137(c) (West 1995).
273
See e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16–10–108 (West 2016) (limiting sanctions for criminal
contempt of court to 30 days’ imprisonment); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1218(a) (West 2007)
(limiting sanctions for criminal contempt of court to a $1,000 fine or five days’
imprisonment); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 4137(c) (West 1995) (limiting sanctions for
criminal contempt of court to a $100 fine or imprisonment for no more than 30 days).
274
Partner in the Chicago matrimonial law firm of Boyle & Feinberg, P.C.
275
Joy M. Feinberg & Lori S. Loeb, Custody and Visitation Interference: Alternative
Remedies, 12 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 271, 276 (1994) (citing Lawrence A. Goldman,
Tortious Interference with Visitation Rights: A New and Important Remedy for NonCustodial Parents, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 307, 313 (1986)).
276
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5–26–502(a) (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5–4–401(a)(3)
(West 2015); CAL. PENAL CODE § 278 (West 2011); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 1103(3)
(West 2016); § 1103(3) (West 2015).
277
Bentch, supra note 42, at 380 (citing Katz, Legal Remedies for Child Snatching, 15
FAM. L.Q. 103, 113 (1981) (criminal sanctions do not themselves guarantee child’s return or
pr[o]vide remedy to wronged parent)).
271
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to be returned to the custodial parent or lawful custodial from whom the
child was taken.278
Therefore, in order to adequately punish and deter parental
kidnapping—a crime that causes serious, long-term harm—courts should
not allow the double jeopardy rule to protect criminal contemnors from
subsequent prosecution under state criminal laws for parental kidnapping.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, courts should not treat criminal
contempt and parental kidnapping as the same offense under the double
jeopardy rule. Due to the material differences between the crimes of
parental kidnapping and contempt of court, giving the state power to
prosecute under its parental kidnapping statutes would not cause any person
to “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb.”279 Thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause should not bar prosecution for
parental kidnapping based on a prior conviction for criminal contempt of
court. Furthermore, criminal prosecution under state statutes is a more
consistent and adequate form of punishment for parental kidnapping than
criminal contempt of court. Therefore, all courts should hold that the state
may prosecute contemnors for parental kidnapping, regardless of whether
they have already received criminal sanctions for contempt of court.

278

See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10–5(h)(i) (2010) (“If during the course of an
investigation under this Section the child is found in the physical custody of the defendant or
another, the law enforcement officer shall return the child to the parent or lawful custodial
from whom the child was concealed, detained, or removed, unless there is good cause for the
law enforcement officer or the Department of Children and Family Services to retain
temporary protective custody of the child pursuant to the Abused and Neglected Child
Reporting Act.”); MINN. STAT. § 609.26 (2009) (“A child who has been concealed, obtained,
or retained in violation of this section shall be returned to the person having lawful custody
of the child.”).
279
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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